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[So F. No. 19238.

In Bank.

May 27, 1955.]

SADIE HILLMAN, Appellant: V. RUDOLPH GARCIA.
RUBY et at, Respondents.
[1] Animals-Injuries by Animals-Liability.-Keeper of animal
of species dangerous by nature or of any animal which he
knows or has reason to know to have dangerous propensities
is liable, without wrongful intent or negligence, for damage
to others resulting from such propensity.
(2] Id.-Injuries by Animals-Liability.-Owner of vicious animal
with knowledge of its vicious propensities is insurer against
acts of animal to one who is injured without fault, and question
of owner's negligence is immaterial.
[8] Id.-Dogs-Actions-Instructions.-In action for personal injuries caused by dog, plaintiff is entitled to instructions in
conformity with rule that keeper of dog, which he knows to
have dangerous propensity, is under absolute duty to restrain
dog.
[4] Id.-Dogs-Actions-Instructions.-Instructions to jury that
if defendants' dog had propensity to do act dangerous to person
or property and defendants knew of such propensity they
were under duty to restrain or confine it are insufficient where
they do not tell jury that such duty was absolute, and where,
when viewed in their context with other instructions, they
set forth duty of ordinary care.
[6] Id.-Dogs-Actions-Instructions.-Although court, in action
for personal injuries caused by dog, erred in rejecting plaintiff's proposed instructions that keeper of dog, which he knows
to have dangerous propensity, is under absolute duty to
restrain dog and in instructing jury that such keeper is only
under duty to exercise ordinary care to restrain dog, such
error was not prejudicial where, in light of uncontradicted
evidence and instructions that were given, jury did not believe
that dog had alleged dangerous propensity or that defendants
knew or should have known that it had.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. Ben V. Curler, Judge.Affirmed.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Animals, § 61 et seq.; Am. Jur. , Animals,

§ 42 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1,2] Animals, § 40; [3-5] Animals, § 65.
• AaBiined bl Ohairman of Judicial Counell.
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Action for damages for personal injuries caused by dog.
Judgment for defendants affirmed.
James C. Purcell and Michael Riordan for Appellant •
• Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon and John F • Ward for
Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J .-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment entered
on a jury verdict in an action for personal injuries. Plaintiff's complaint alleged, and evidence was introduced to
support the allegations, that as she was walking along a
public sidewalk defendants' police dog jumped upon and
knocked her down causing severe injuries, that the dog had
a propensity to jump on people, that defendants knew of
this propensity, and that, notwithstanding this knowledge,
defendants allowed the dog to roam at large without restraint.
The defendants' evidence showed that the dog was a gentle
dog with no propensity to jump on people and that it had
merely accidentally bumped into plaintiff while playing with
another dog.
Plaintiff does not question the sufficiency of the evidence
to support the judgment. Her sole contention is that the
court erroneously failed to instruct the jury in accordancd
with the applicable rule of law.
There is no dispute as to that rule. [1] "The keeper of
an animal of a species dangerous by nature, or of any animal
which he knows, or has reason to know, to have dangerous
propensities, is liable, without wrongful intent or negligence,
for damage to others resulting from such a propensity."
(Prosser, Torts, p. 432; Gooding v. Ohutes 00., 155 Cal. 620,
624 [102 P. 819, 18 Ann.Cas. 671, 23 L.R.A.N.S. 1071];
OZowdis v. Fresno Flume etc. 00., 118 Cal. 315, 320 [50 P.
373, 62 Am.St.Rep. 238]; Heath v. Fruzia, 50 Cal.App.2d
598, 600 [123 P.2d 560] ; Opelt v. Al. G. Barnes 00., 41 Cal.
App. 776, 779 [183 P. 241]; see 3 C.J .S., "Animals,"
§ 148; ct. Civ. Code, §§ 3341, 3342.) [2] The liability of
the keeper is absolute, for "[ t] he gist of the action is not
the manner of keeping the vicious animal, but the keeping
him at all with knowledge of the vicious propensities. [Citation.] In such instances the owner is an insurer against
the acts of the animal, to one who is injured without fault.
and the question of the ownt'r's negligence is not in the case.
[Citations.]" (Opelt v. Al. G. Barnes Co., supra, 41 Cal.
App. 776, 779.)
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[3] Plaintiff was entitled to instructions in conformity
with this rule. (Daniels v. Oity & Oounty of Ban Francisco,
40 Ca1.2d 614, 623 [255 P.2d 785].) [4] The instructions
that were givenl told the jury that if defendants' dog had
a propensity to do an act dangerous to person or property
and defendants knew of that propensity they were under a
duty to restrain or confine it. These instructions, however,
did not tell the jury that this duty was an absolute duty,
and when viewed in their context with other instructions2
they set forth a duty of ordinary care. It is clearly apparent
from the court's rejectiQn of certain of plaintiff's proposed
instructions,S its modification of certain of her proposed instructions,4 and its withdrawal Ii of one of her proposed
instructions after reading it to the jury, that the court understood the duty to be one of ordinary care and so instructed
the jury.
[5] Although the court erred in rejecting plaintiff's proposed instl'uctions that the keeper of a dog, which he knows
to ha\"e a dangerous propensity, is under an absolute duty
to restrain the dog and in instructing the jury that such a
keeper is only under a duty to exercise ordinary care to
restrain the dog, we do not believe that the error was prejuII'If the keeper of a dog knows that the dog was accustomed to jump
on human beings, the keeper's liability is not affected by the hi~h
character of the dog for mildness among the neighbors.
" The intent with which 8 dog inflicts injury upon a human being is
Dot material.·
I I If a keeper of a dog knows it to have dangerous propensities, he is
under a duty to restrain it or confine it that it may Dot exercise its
propensity to the injury of another.
"It is the duty of the keeper of a dog to inform himself or herself
of the habits and disposition of said dog."
8They were immediately followed by an instruction that "A keeper
of a dog must use that degree of care to restrain it that an ordinarily
prudent person would havp. used in the same or similar circumstances."
The jury was also instructed that " under the Jaw of this state every
person is bound, without contract, to abstain from injuring the person
or property of anotber or from infringing upon any of his rigbts, and
that everyone is responsible for injury occasioned to another for his want
of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person.
However, defendant was not an insurer of the safety of the plaintiff or
the public." (Plaintiff's proposed instruction No. 31, as modified by the
court's addition of the last sentence.)
8For example, plaintiff's proposed instruction number 2: "The keeper
of any dog which he knows or has reason to know to have dangerous
propensities is liable without wrongful intent or negligence for damages
to others proximately resulting from such a propensity."
'See, for example, the modification of plaintiff's proposed instruction
Dumber 31, quoted in note 2, 81lpra.
-:Plainti1f'. proposed instruction number 2, quoted in Roie a, ~G.
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628

HILLMAN tI. GARCIA-RUBY

[44 C.2d

dicial. The absolute duty to restrain the dog could not be
invoked unless the jury found, not only that the dog had
the alleged dangerous propensity, but that defendants knew
or should have known that it had. In the light of the uncontradicted evidence and the instructions that were given, it
is clear that the jury did not believe that the dog had the
alleged dangerous propensity or that defendants knew or
should have known that it had. Had there been conflicting
evidence in this case on the issue of restraint the error would
have been prejudicial. The uncontradicted evidence affirmatively shows, however, that defendants did nothing whatever
to restrain the dog and allowed it to roam at will. Had the
jury believed that the dog had the alleged dangerous propensity and that defendants knew it or should have known it,
they were compelled by the instructions given to return a
verdict for plaintiff, for a showing of a complete lack of any
care to restrain the dog would show a violation of a duty to
use reasonable care to restrain it. It follows that the jury
must have found that the dog did not have the alleged dangerous propensity, or that defendants did not know or were not
charged with notice of such propensity, and that a contrary
result would not have been reached even if all the requested
instructions had been given.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-l dissent.
I had heretofore thought that at least one rule of law
remained firmly fixed in the jurisprudence of this state: that
a party litigant was, at the very least, entitled to have the
jury correctly instructed as to the law as it related to his
particular lawsuit. The majority opinion frankly admits that
there is no dispute as to what the applicable rule of law is;
that plaintiff was entitled to instructions in conformity with
the rule; that the jury was clearly misinformed by the court
as to that rule of law.
The evidence was sharply conflicting as to whether the dog
had dangerous propensities. If the dog did have dangerous
propensities, defendant was under an absolute duty to restrain
it. The matter is just as simple as that, but the jury was
not so instructed. It was instructed that defendant must
only exercise ordinary care.
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Plaintiff's theory was that the dog had dangerous propensities which were known to defendant. She was entitled to
have the jury instructed in accordance with that theory:
Buckley v. Silverberg, 113 Cal. 673 [45 P. 804] j Ritchey v.
Watson,204 Cal. 387 [268 P. 345] j Waniorek v. United Railroads, 17 Cal.App. 121 [118 P. 947] j Klamath etc. 00. v.
Oo-operative etc. 00., 25 Cal.App. 678 [145 P. 159]; Oassinelli v. Bennen, 110 Cal.App. 722 [294 P. 748] ; Buckley v.
Shell Ohemical 00., 32 Cal.App.2d 209 [89 P.2d 453] ; Lewis
v. Western Truck Line, 44 Cal.App.2d 455 [112 P.2d 747];
McGowan v. Oity of Los Angeles, 100 Cal.App.2d 386 [223
P.2d 862, 21 A.L.R.2d 1206] j Daniels v. Oity & Oounty of
Ban Francisco, 40 Ca1.2d 614 [255 P.2d 785] j Perin v. Nelson
& Sloan, 119 Cal.App.2d 560 [259 P.2d 959] j Rideau v. Los
Angeles Transit Lines, 124 Cal.App.2d 466 [268 P.2d 772] ;
Sills v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 40 Cal.2d 630, 640 [255
P.2d 795]; Petersen v. Rieschel, 115 Cal.App.2d 758 [252
P.2d 986]; Summers v. Randall, 123 Cal.App.2d 113 [266
P.2d 217] ; Nelson v. Angel, 124 Cal.App.2d 861 [269 P.2d
626].
A jury is bound to follow the law as it is given to it in
the instructions given by the court. The rule is set forth
in 24 California Jurisprudence, section 96, page 822, as follows: "As a general rule instructions excluding issues or
defenses which are supported by evidence are prejudicially
erroneous." (Emphasis added.) If the jury is not instructed
as to the law applicable to plaintiff's case it must, in effect,
find for the defendant. Under the circumstances how can
it be said that instructions giving only defendant's theory of
the case did not prejudice plaintiff Y The majority indulges
in speculation in order to decide just what the jury thought
in returning its verdict. The trial court was of the opinion
that ordinary care was all that was required of defendant
and the jury was so instructed. The theory of plaintiff's case
was never brought to the attention of the jury and, as a
)Oesult, she has been denied her day in court.
The judgment should be reversed.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 23,
195!'i. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be g l ' a l l L e d . "
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